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ABSTRACT
A flow model is hypothesized to explain the movement of technology
by an entrepreneur from an outside "source organization" to form the
initial technological basis for a new enterprise. Data from a
longitudinal study of several hundred technological "spinoff" firms
support the dominance of development in contrast with research work
as the key source of the founding technology. Positive personal
influences upon technology movement include longer employment at a
"source" organization, advanced education at around the Masters level,
and sensing an opportunity to exploit laboratory technology. Principal
dissipating influences are personal aging of the entrepreneur and a
delay between leaving the source and establishing the new firm.
3The forty plus years since World War II have defined technological
advance as an integral part of our society and a key basis for both military
and industrial competition. Among other vital contributions, technology
provides the raison d'etre for the formation and growth of myriad new firms.
The opportunities presented by advancing technology, however, have not been
seized by all potential entrepreneurs. The unique companies that are
technology-based new enterprises were for the most part founded by
individuals highly trained in existing technology. The new technical ventures
have originated from similar technology-based organizational environments
or sources.
All entrepreneurs must possess some sort of entrepreneurial spirit.
Indeed increasing numbers of studies are examining the personal
characteristics of entrepreneurs, especially those who are technology-based,
and the nature of the organizations that incubate them. (Cooper, 1971;
Roberts, 1968; Sexton and Smilor, 1986; Utterback et al., 1988; Van de Ven,
Hudson and Schroeder, 1983) However, new technology-based companies are
in addition dependent on the transfer of technology or technological knowhow
learned or created by the entrepreneur. Although a few studies have
addressed technological aspects of strategy for growing the young enterprise,
(Meyer and Roberts, 1988; Romanelli, 1987) only rarely has the technical base
of the firm at its time of origin been examined. (Roberts and Hauptman, 1986)
This article provides a theoretical framework and empirical evidence on the
determinants of the initial technological basis for these new enterprises.
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Figure 1 presents a schematic (or flow model) of what might be
involved in the personal generation and/or use of technology, here applied as
the basis for a new firm. The diagram's elements constitute the set of
hypotheses to be tested in this paper. First we assume there must
necessarily be some technological knowhow worthy of transfer. This source
of skills or knowledge might derive from several different cognitive realms
in combination or separately (e.g., work experience, educational experience,
the contents of a journal, knowledge of a friend). Every further step in the
process leading to personally-transferred technology into a new firm builds
from this first platform.
Next the information available at the source of technology must be
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personally absorbed by an individual. To learn such technology an individual
must be exposed to the source and have the ability and attitude to comprehend
and perhaps interpret and apply the information. Length of exposure to a
technology source is only one of several dimensions that potentially affect
learning. The breadth of exposure, to knowledge creation as well as use,
further influences the rate of possible learning.
Educational preparedness for learning must play a role in this transfer
process. The layman has difficulties in acquiring knowledge of theoretical
physics, even when opportunely exposed to excellent sources of such
knowledge, without a prior grounding in physics or advanced mathematics
principles. And attitudinal preparedness, a willingness and interest in
absorbing new skills and tools, must also be present. Within the same
organization, some delight in its stimuli and challenge; others are bored, and
can't wait to get home.
These two influences, the degree of exposure to a source of potential
new technology and the personal ability and attitude to comprehend the
knowledge, combine in a not-well understood gating function to affect the
individual scientist's or engineers learning. The learning adds to the
individual's storehouse of potentially usable technology. But the mere
existence of personally accessible information is not sufficient for useful
technology transfer to occur. Dissipative influences and lack of opportunity
can block effective exploitation of potentially useful information. For
example, continued lack of exposure to opportunities, or lack of ability to
recognize opportunities, for application of his or her newly acquired knowhow
no doubt causes the individual eventually to forget the technical knowhow. Or
while not forgotten, the technology may cease to be as useful because
problems for which it was once applicable no longer exist (or their priority
has lessened). The technology obsoletes. Thus in time a pool of usable
knowledge gradually shrinks unless replenished by new learning.
The final flow in this process, the one of objective interest to us, is the
transfer of technology into use. The prime influence on this final stage of
transfer appears a priori to be the opportunities for technology use, such as
in the formation of a new enterprise. But second order influences are
probably at work too. For example, the greater the base of usable technology
the greater the likelihood of some matching between knowhow and application
6opportunity. But there is also increased likelihood that someone who has
achieved useful techology transfer in the past accustoms himself to sensing
new opportunities as they arise. That person is not only ready and waiting
when opportunity knocks; he or she knows where to wait!
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The data analyzed here are part of a twenty years study of all aspects
of the formation and growth of high-technology new enterprises, including
more than 40 separate but related research studies. The data collected in
thirteen of those studies (shown in Table 1) are used in this article, covering
several hundred firms founded by former employees of MIT major laboratories
and engineering departments as well as the former employees of a
government laboratory, a major non-profit systems engineering organization
and two large technological corporations.
Table 1. Spin-off Companies from Technological Source Organizations
New Companies Participants in
Sources of New Enterprises Identified Research Study
MIT major laboratories (4 studies) 107 96
MIT academic departments (5 studies) 74 60
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory 16 15
MITRE Corporation 5 5
Electronic systems company 45 39
Diversified technological company 8 _23
Totals 305 238
Beginning with strong cooperation of senior managers in each source
organization, initial lists were developed of suggested names of spin-off
entrepreneurs from that organization. Follow-up interviews were used to
screen these lists for inappropriate names as well as to generate further
suggestions in a "snowball" sample creation process. Rigorous criteria were
applied to include only those who had been former full-time employees of the
7source organizations, who later participated as founders of wholly-new
for-profit companies. (As very few female entrepreneurs were found in these
samples of technical entrepreneurs, the male pronoun will be used in the
remainder of this article in referring to the entrepreneurs.)
Structured interviews with a detailed questionnaire, lasting typically
one to two and one-half hours, were used to gather data from each
entrepreneur personally, with telephone interviews used in less than ten
percent of the cases and mailed interviews used only as a last resort in less
than one percent of the cases. Some interviews stretched to seven or eight
hours over two or three sessions! Despite extensive efforts to include all
spin-offs from each source organization studied, no doubt some minor bias
has crept into the sample of companies studied in that it is likely that any
companies not located were less successful than those traced.
INDICATORS AND MEASURES
Answers to the detailed questionnaires led easily to the quantification
of information. Most all of the answers were coded and arranged in computer
data files. Incomplete information on some of the companies does not
particularly affect the data analysis as relevant codes were given to isolate
missing information. Conceptual and practical issues arose in measuring
certain key elements in the studies, of which the most significant to the
present article is the importance of the technology transferred from the
source organization into the new enterprise.
The Importance of Initial Transferred Technology
The process of individual transfer of technology as outlined in Figure 1
presumably occurs to some extent whenever any new enterprise is begun.
What is not so clear is the degree to which this transfer takes place and the
role that specific organizations play in this process. The first issue we faced
in gaining more insight into the process was the need for a simple measure of
the degree of importance of initial technology transfer. Each company in our
samples was rated on a four-point scale representing the extent to which it
was dependent on technologies developed at the "source" laboratory under
study. The rating was derived by observation of the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the enterprise, by consideration of the nature of
the company's products, and by the statements of the entrepreneur himself.
8As an initial trial of this way of assessing technological dependence,
this measure was determined for one hundred and twenty-five MIT-based
spin-off companies. For assuring the reliability of these trial ratings, two
different coders evaluated a subset of the companies, with almost no
disagreement between their classifications. In addition, the entrepreneurs'
former laboratory supervisors were asked to rank the companies on this
variable, as part of a separate backup study. Their classifications correlated
significantly with those assigned by the coders (p=.007). The intercoder
reliability and the supervisor concurrence in this trial provided confidence in
the use of this measure throughout our spinoff studies.
The importance of technology transferred from the source organization
on the formation of the spin-off firms was divided into: Direct, partial,
vague, and none. These degrees of importance of transferred technology are
defined as follows:
Direct: The company in its present form would not have been
started without the source-learned technologies. It now utilizes
or utilized at the beginning mostly what the founder(s) learned at
the source.
Partial: An important aspect of the company's work originated
with source-learned technologies. The individual who transferred
the technology might have supplemented the source-learned
techologies at other employment between the laboratory and the
new enterprise.
Vague: Nothing specific was transferred. However, general
technical background and know-how learned at the source were
very important. In this case, the company might have been started
without the source experience.
None: Essentially nothing that the company does is related to
source technologies. The individual who started the company may
have learned an extensive amount at the source but he is not
utilizing this (from a technological standpoint) in his new
enterprise.
9The definitions utilized in the scale are specific to the source
organizations under study. In other words a rating on importance of
technology transfer for an MIT Lincoln Laboratory spin-off company relates
only to the degree of dependence on Lincoln technologies. In addition, note
that the terms "partial" and "vague" somewhat understate the importance of
the source-learned technology in the formation of these new enterprises. In
each of these categories, learned technology is unquestionably important; the
difference is only in degree. Only the category of "none" dismisses the
importance of the learned-technology.
As shown in Table 2 thirty-two new companies were directly affected
by the learned technology, thirty-four partially, forty-three vaguely, and
sixteen not at all. In all, then, one hundred and nine companies of these 125
felt the source-learned technology important to their creation.
Table 2. Degree of Importance of Technology Transfer (N=125 MIT Spinoffs)
No. of
Companies
32
34
43
125
% of
Companies
26
27
34
100%
The distribution in Table 2 indicates that only 13% of the companies had
no technical dependence whatsoever on the spawning source laboratory,
whereas 53% were critically or importantly dependent on laboratory-learned
Direct
Partial
Vague
None
Totals
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technologies. Some of the cases of "no transfer" arise from our tight
definition of "spinoff", which forces inclusion in our samples of some
companies in which the individual from "our" source organization was only a
weak member of the founding group. Others are more straightforward in that
the company is working in areas totally dissassociated from work carried on
in the so-called "source" organization.
The importance of transferred technology from industrial source
organizations was more varied than from the MIT labs and departments.
"Direct" technological dependence accounted for only 16 percent of the
electronic systems company's spinoffs, with "partial" transfer representing
an additional 24 percent, according to the entrepreneurs' own estimates.
These self-estimates may be prejudiced downward, however, due to
entrepreneurs' concern about possible legal actions by the source industrial
organization we had studied. The Legal Department of that electronics
company told us of relationships with 12 of our studied 39 spinoffs, including
lawsuits, licensing agreements, and formal waivers of rights to technology.
Most businesses educate large numbers of people in developing and using
complex technology. But these firms usually do not want these people
transferring outside the walls of the company the knowledge they have
learned inside. The typical firm wishes to protect its huge investments by
preventing this knowledge from leaving the company. Business is fearful of
competitors acquiring knowledge of vital inside operations and proprietary
technology. Many companies are just as concerned about the people who leave
and utilize the technology they have learned to form profitable enterprises in
competing or even non-competing areas. These attitudes are obviously quite
different from MIT's strongly positive orientation toward its science and
technology being transferred out to benefit commerce, industry and society.
In the case of the spinoffs from the diversified technological
corporation, the company was apparently unconcerned about the
commercialization of spinoff technology. Indeed, 48 percent of its spinoff
founders indicated that his company could not have started in its present
form without technology from the parent ("direct transfer"), while 17 percent
indicated partial technological dependence.
This discussion does not address the question of the financial value of
this transferred technology. Nor does it treat what impact this initial
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technology might have on success or failure of the new firm. The latter issue
will be addressed in later analyses of our new enterprise database.
SOURCES OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
Having established that transferred technology serves as a critical base
for many of the new enterprises, I begin here to test the model presented in
Figure 1 and to present the results. Data do not exist to verify all elements
of that implicit set of hypotheses, but much of the figure can be examined
with information gathered from our research.
Development Work
Despite the fact that the source organizations studied all engaged in a
broad spectrum of research and development work, I have shown elsewhere
that technical entrepreneurs are especially biased in their orientation to
developmental activities. (Roberts, 1968) Now I move the argument one step
further to claim that development work, not research, is the much more
fertile bed of immediately applicable advanced technology which potentially
can become the basis for a new company. Only in the rare circumstances of a
major breakthrough such as the transistor does research become the
immediate basis for a product-oriented firm. Development in contrast takes
research results and new technical knowledge and advances them toward and
into application and use. Indeed the recent formation of numerous new firms
in the biotechnology and genetic engineering field reinforces in a rather
unique manner the evidence for this developmental dependency. All of the
biotech firms have had to go through an extended and expensive research and
development stage, post formation of the firm, in order to bring their prior
knowledge base to a state of development adequate for product development
and release.
To support this argument I examine first those entrepreneurs who had
no delay between leaving the source labs and starting their own companies.
Table 3 displays the level of technology transfer associated with the nature
of work which the entrepreneur had performed at the source organization for
fifty-one entrepreneurs who went immediately into their new enterprises.
As their prior work becomes more developmental (i.e. as measured by
increasing "Bullpup ratings" 1 from 1 to 9), both an increasing proportion of
direct technology transfer occurs (30%, 39%, and 55%, in order) as well as an
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increasing proportion of direct and partial technology transfer (53%, 67%, and
85%, respectively). The type of work done at the source, the base for
potential applicable technology, significantly affects the level of technology
transfer into the new firm (p=.025). Thus a double filter is at work: More
development-oriented individuals become entrepreneurs, and more
development-oriented entrepreneurs transfer more advanced technology
immediately into their companies.
Table 3. Nature of Source Work and Technology Transfer
for Immediate Company Founders (N=51)
Nature of Work* Technology Transfer*
("Bulpup Ratings) Direc Partial Vaue QNone
1-3 4 3 4 2
4-6 7 5 5 1
7-9 11 6 3 0
*Kendall Tau =.25, p=.025
Viewed slightly differently, research-oriented people who establish
new companies have less work-derived technology to apply immediately in
their new settings. They must draw from a broader array of other, mostly
older, research results in order to generate a base for a new firm, or they
must have longer time available, either prior to starting a firm or once the
firm is underway, for their more recent research to be brought into
development and application. This corresponds in direction but not degree to
the Project Hindsight findings that little Department of Defense research had
found its way into operational military use within a twenty-year period of
the research being carried out. (Sherwin and Isenson, 1967)
1 The "Bullpup" measure of R&D work content was developed by Chalmers W.
Sherwin and Raymond S. Isenson as part of the DOD's "Project Hindsight".
(Sherwin and Isenson, 1967)
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Another cut at our own data bolsters this argument. Table 4 shows the
nature of source work vs. degree of technology transfer for those
entrepreneurs who did delay after leaving the source before setting up their
new firms. Researchers who wait have relatively more apparent
opportunity for meaningful transfer than do development-types who wait.
Research results "age" less rapidly than development; if anything, the
research may become more relevant and applicable with time, whereas the
development-stage work becomes more obsolescent and less applicable to the
new firm. The Table 4 statistics support the direction of this effect,
although not significantly.
Table 4. Nature of Source Work and Technology Transfer
for Delayed Company Founders (N=41)
Technology Transfer *
Nature of Work Direct-Partial Vague-None
Research
(1-3) 4 3
Development
(4-9) 12 22
DEGREE OF EXPOSURE
Years at Source
The amount of time the potential entrepreneur works at a source
organization no doubt relates to the degee to which he learns and probably
transfers that organization's technology into his new enterprise. Remember
that the measure of degree of technology transfer really measures technical
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dependence. However, individual differences might produce differing
patterns of learning over time. Some individuals are rapid learners, absorbing
most of what is known within their environs quickly, reflected by the top
curve in Figure 2. Others tend to have a more steady pace of knowledge
absorption or even a pattern of learning that starts slowly and gradually
accelerates, indicated by the two lower curves in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Possible Patterns of Individual Learning
Analysis of the relationship between the number of years a MIT-spinoff
entrepreneur spent at the source laboratory and the degree to which he
transferred its technology produces statistically significant results (Kendall
Tau =0.17, p=.03). Moreover, careful rechecking finds that this trend is linear,
and not curvilinear, as the years of employment grow. Similarly, those
electronic systems company spinoffs who spent longer in that company
reported that their work at the lab caused them to learn more technology as
opposed to just applying their prior knowledge (p=.03); those longer employed
entrepreneurs also transferred significantly more technology to their new
enterprises than did their shorter employed colleagues (p=.03).
Part-Time Founding
A second element of exposure relates to timing. Over half of the
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companies, perhaps a surprising number, were started on a part-time basis,
"moonlighting" in the new firm while still working "full time" in the source
organization. "Part-timers" have concurrent exposure to the needs of the new
firm and the solutions from the prior (i.e., also still current) organization.
Part-time entrepreneurs from MIT labs transferred more technology to their
operations than full-time entrepreneurs (p=.03). In the Massachusetts
biomedical firms I studied the duration of part-time commitment was longer
on average, 30 months, than in any other of my entrepreneurial samples.
(Roberts and Hauptman, 1986) In those firms too, part-time founded
companies had higher degrees of advanced technology coming from university
and other source organizations (p=.05). Logically, or selfishly, the part-time
entrepreneur who is still working at a source laboratory should be trying to
gain an advantage by making his efforts work for double purposes. He is more
likely to transfer into his company technology related to lab projects on
which he is currently working and ideas that are current in his laboratory. In
attempting to conserve his efforts by using his laboratory endeavors to
provide commercial possiblities, the part-time entrepreneur becomes an
effective agent of technology transfer.
PERSONAL ABILITY AND ATTITUDE
One factor no doubt affecting learning rate is the individual's ability to
perceive, comprehend and extrapolate the relevant technology. This suggests
looking at the entrepreneurs education as a possible surrogate for technology
transfer ability.
Formal Education
But our measure of degree of technology transfer does not differentiate
on relative sophistication of the technology, only on the receiving company's
relative technological dependence. In any event formal educational
attainment is not necessarily a valid representation of an individual's
capacity to learn or of his acquired fund of knowledge. For example, in at
least one new enterprise a technician with no formal education beyond high
school supplied the technical basis for a sophisticated product in a new
technological area for his company.
Despite these qualifications we tested the data for the association
between educational level and technology transfer and found a weak positive
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relationship (Kendall Tau = 0.13, p=0.07). Earlier analyses have shown that
technical entrepreneurs seem to cluster around the Master's degree
educational level. If that clustering also affected the degree of source
technology exploited through transfer to the new firm, we should expect a
quadratic relationship as pictured in Figure 3.
Degree of
Technology
Transfer
Educational Level
Figure 3. Possible Relationship between Educational Level
and Technoloqi Transfer
This hypothesis resulted in regrouping the data to separate moderately
educated technical entrepreneurs from those with either lower or higher
education, as indicated in Table 5, clustering the groups to equalize as
closely as possible the totals around the margins. Statistical testing (i.e.
the F-test) supports the notion that entrepreneurs with Master's degrees
(more or less) transferred the most technology (p=0.05).
But just as education (up to a point) is supportive of an individual's
ability to comprehend and his likelihood of transferring new technology, age
may well suggest limitations on these abilities. Despite its controversial
nature much evidence indicates that a person's technical abilities tend to
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Table 5. Relationship between Grouped Educational Levels
and Technology Transfer *
Degree of Technology Transfer
Educational
Level Direct-Partial VYague-None Totals
Moderate education, i.e.
B.S. plus courses,
M.S., and
M.S. plus courses 33 24 57
Lower and higher education, i.e.
College without degree,
and B.S., plus
Professional Engineering
degree and Ph.D. 19 23 42
Totals 52 47 99
*Group boundaries established to equalize as closely as possible the marginal
totals.
peak between 30 to 40 years of age and begin to wane after that. In any event
our earlier analyses have shown that the ages for entrepreneurial behavior
have similar character. (Roberts and Wainer, 1971)
Logically, younger men, being closer to new technological developments
and presumably more capable of grasping the complexities involved, seem
likely to transfer more technology than older entrepreneurs. In Table 6 one
hundred fifteen entrepreneurs are grouped according to their age at the
founding of their companies and their level of technology transfer. The
greatest proportion of direct and partial transfer occurs in the age range of
26-30 years; the lowest is in the range of 46-50. Direct and partial
technology transfer decrease as age increases (p=.03). Aging does appear to
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affect overall the extent of transferred technology.
Table 6. Age of Entrepreneur and Technology Transfer (N = 115)
Technoloav Transfer*
Age*
21-25
26-30 10
10
7
2
2
2
1
4
13
7
5
4
2
1
6
3
2
1
2
9
31-35 10
36-40 6
41-45 4
46-50
>50 2
*Kendall's Tau C=0.15, p=0.03
Further analyses of the data show that much of this effect arises from
a reluctance of the older men who do eventually become entrepreneurs to
leave the source lab and immediately set up their own companies. Those who
leave the lab, take another job, and later start their own firm are older by the
time they become entrepreneurs. But even within that group of delaying
company founders (illustrated in Table 4) age is negatively and significantly
correlated with technology transfer (Tau = -.26, p=.01).
Attitude
__
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Beyond issues of ability, an individual's attitude toward his or her work
plays an important role in the learning process. A person who finds work
challenging and enjoyable can be expected to learn more easily and develop
skills more readily than a person who finds work boring or painful.
Additionally, a person who likes what he or she is doing would most probably
want to continue that type of work in future employment (or
self-employment!).
When applying this consideration to technology transfer, I expect that
those entrepreneurs who had found their source work challenging and
enjoyable would transfer more source technology into their new companies
than those who did not. Table 7 shows how ninety-four entrepreneurs rated
the challenge of their source work. The sole entrepreneur who felt his work
was not challenging transferred none of the source's technology. Of the six
entrepreneurs who felt the work minimally challenging (rating of 2), none had
companies which directly involved the source technology and only one formed
a company involving even partial transfer of source technology. As the rating
of challenge increases, the proportion generally increases of direct and
partial transfer of technology into the new enterprise. Forty-two percent of
the individuals who rated the challenge of their source as 5, directly or
Table 7. Challenge of Source Work and Technology Transfer (N=94)
Technology Transfer*
Challenge* Direct Partial Vaue None
(No Challenge) 1 - - 1
2 - 1 2 3
3 1 - -
4 3 3 1 -
5 4 6 11 3
6 9 7 13 3
(Very Challenging) 7 11 8 4 -
*Tau 0.30, p=0.001.
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partially transferred source technology into their companies. Fifty percent
who rated the challenge as 6, and over eighty percent who rated the
challenges as 7 (very challenging), formed companies directly or partially
dependent on source technology.
This same relationship was found between technology transfer and
satisfaction with work. Table 8 displays data for ninety-seven
entrepreneurs. As their ratings of satisfaction and enjoyment with their
earlier source lab work experience rose from hate and dissatisfaction to
much satisfaction and very enjoyable, an increasing proportion of the
entrepreneurs transferred source technology directly or partially into their
new companies (p=.015). Beginning with the rating of 4 (neutral) and ending
with that of 7 (much enjoyment and satisfaction), these proportions are
forty-one percent, forty-one percent, fifty-one percent, and sixty-seven
percent respectively.
Table 8. Satisfaction and Enjoyment of Source Work
and Technology Transfer (N=97)
Technology Transfer *
Satisfaction
and EnjoiQyment* Direct Partial None
(Much Dissatisfaction
and Hate of Work) 1 - -
2 - 1 - -
3 - -
Neutral 4 2 1 1 3
5 2 4 2 6
6 13 8 17 3
(Much Satisfaction) 7 11 11 10 1
*Tau .21, p=.015
Since the challenge of the work and the satisfaction and enjoyment in
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doing the work are strongly related (Tau=.60, p<.001), we can conclude that
the entrepreneurs attitude toward his work has much to do with the level of
technology he transfers into his new company. Furthermore, partial
correlation analyses indicate that the link between challenge and transfer
(r=0.19) is far stronger than that between satisfaction and transfer (r=0.04).
It is worth noting in this regard that the causal relationship between
technology transfer and perceived work satisfaction might be in the opposite
direction. An entrepreneur who senses important transfer of technology from
his previous job to his new enterprise might well more appreciate that prior
job and express strong satisfaction with it.
DISSIPATIVE INFLUENCES
Thusfar we have presented a number of forces that contribute a base
and learning to help establish the potential entrepreneurs usable store of
technology. But technology doesn't remain ripe for plucking; some of it
decays in utility by becoming less timely; other ideas or skills are just
forgotten or lost over time.
Years between Source and New Enterprise
A common business practice is to have employees sign restrictive
contracts which, among other things, usually forbid the employee upon
termination of work with the company to work for a competing company or to
enter into any business in which he can utilize the methods and knowledge he
has acquired. This restriction generally holds for from one to three years
after termination of employment. While many reasons are given for having
this restrictive period, one of the prime reasons is that a company does not
want an employee to use its technology to compete against it. By having a
period of exclusion, companies feel that the employee's capability of
effectively transferring company technology is considerably reduced.
The information collected on the spin-off entrepreneurs strongly
supports this contention, even though many of the entrepreneurs came from
university laboratories which did not follow these restrictive practices.
Figure 4 shows the incidence of new enterprise formation over time,
following departure from a source organization. Sixty-three of the one
hundred twenty-one spin-offs in this grouping were formed immediately after
the entrepreneur left the source or while he was still at the source.
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Figure 4. Rate of New Company Formation Related to the
Number of Years afterTermination of Employment
at the Source Organization
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Eighty-five were formed within four years after leaving. In Table 9, one
hundred eighteen of these companies were grouped by the time of company
formation after termination of source employment and by their degree of
technology transfer. The numbers displayed need little interpretation. Of
Table 9. Years between Source and New Enterprise
vs. Technology Transfer (N=1 18)
Technoloav Transfer *
Number of Years *
(Immediately)
*Tau=.37, p<0.001
Direct
0
1-2
3-4
5-6
25
2
3
1
7-8
9 -10 1
Partial
19
3
6
3
1
1
>10
Yague
13 5
2
4
6
2
2
19
1 3
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the thirty-two companies which directly utilized source technology, thirty
were formed within four years after their founder left the source. Of the
thirty-three which partially utilized source technology, twenty-eight were
formed within four years after source employment was terminated. Viewing
this in another way, thirty-six percent of the companies formed within four
years directly utilized source technology and thirty-three percent of them
partially utilized that technology. In comparison, only six percent of the
companies formed after four years directly utilized source technology and
only twelve percent partially utilized that technology. The relationship
l- n- r 5-- _ ~ l - -: 
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between time after leaving and transference of technology is very strong
(Tau=.37, p<0.001).
The longer the time lag between leaving the source organization and
setting up the new company, the less the degree of source-learned technology
transferred (p=.001). In the time elapsed the technological advantage that a
scientist or engineer possesses at a frontier research and development
organization is in part lost. As time passes the individual's technological
knowhow from lab employment becomes irrelevant, and the degree of transfer
necessarily decreases as time from the source lab increases.
The lost technological competitive advantage specifically reflects the
relative advancedness of the "source" organization. Our data indicate that the
prospective entrepreneur may reinforce rather than dissipate the knowledge
he gained at a university or other advanced laboratory if he next works for
another university or non-profit government-sponsored laboratory, rather
than for a commercial concern. The degree of technology transfer is strongly
but inversely related to the number of years of commercial experience
between the source laboratory and the new enterprise. But practically no
relationship whatsoever exists between the degree of technology transfer and
the number of years of non-commercial experience between the laboratory
and the new enterprise. Indirectly this notion supports the hypothesis that
commercial experience has more of a decaying effect on the degree of source
technology transfer to the new firm than does non-commercial experience. No
data were collected on the importance of technologies transferred from the
intervening organization(s) to the new enterprise.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR TECHNOLOGY USE
Nearly half of the spin-off entrepreneurs were indicated to have
engaged in other activities between the time they left their source work and
the time they formed their companies. Reasonably this group of
entrepreneurs had different motives for leaving the sources and possibly
were attracted to business ownership for different reasons than the group
that left and immediately formed their companies. Surprisingly each group
mentioned nearly identical reasons for leaving their source work, and both
groups gave similar reasons for being attracted to business ownership.
Technology as a Factor in Leaving
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The only differences which could be found among these entrepreneurs
was the importance which the source technology played as a factor in their
leaving the sources. Table 10 displays those data. Over half of the
entrepreneurs (27 of 52) who left the sources and immediately formed their
companies stated that the utilization of technology was the prime reason for
their leaving. In comparison only twenty percent of the entrepreneurs (9 of
44) who formed their companies later stated technology utilization as an
important factor. When asked if they would leave without the technology,
seventy percent of the entrepreneurs who did not immediately form their
companies said "yes" while only thirty-six percent of those who immediately
entered their new ventures responded affirmatively.
Table 10. Technology as a Factor in Leaving Source Employment (N = 96)
Went
Immediately
Use technology as prime reason
for leaving source* 27 25
Into Business
Later
9 35
Would leave source without
technology** 18 31 26 11
*Differences in groups: Chi Square = 8.77, p=.005
**Differences in groups: Chi Square = 8.20, p=.005
As would be expected, those entrepreneurs who stated that the use of
laboratory technology was their prime reason for leaving transferred the
greatest amount of technology to the companies they formed (p=.001). They
also had longer laboratory employment (p=.02) and a shorter average time lag
Question
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between leaving the lab and setting up their own company (p=.002).
These findings are reflected nearly across the board in all the spin-off
samples. Among the entrepreneurs who left the electronic systems company,
many had received patents for advancing laboratory technology. Those patent
holders transferred significantly more technology to their new firms (p=.04),
sometimes with licenses from the source corporation, an explicit form of
recognition of opportunities inherent in the new technology. Another example
of identifying opportunities for technology use is provided by 60 percent of
the spin-offs started directly from the diversified technological corporation,
where the founder's decision to start a company depended on his knowledge of
a product or service that he felt was not being adequately developed or
commercialized by the source. In these cases, each founder usually took some
or all of the product's technology with him to the new business, usually by
agreement with the source corporation.
SUMMARY
This article has explained empirically the technological basis for the
spin-off new enterprise. A conceptual model was presented of a variety of
influences upon the flow of technology from an advanced research and
development "source organization" into a newly founded company. The
measure used to assess the final technology transferred is a four-point scale
of importance of the technology to the new firm: Direct, partial, vague, and
none. Evaluating the spin-offs with this measure generates a broad
distribution of outcomes, with the highest manifested technology transfer
affecting about one-quarter of the new companies.
The results of "hypotheses testing" of the Figure 1 model are synopsized
in Table 11. Development-oriented work at the source organization, not
research work, is shown to be the primary origin for most of the transferred
technology. A double filter is in effect: More development-oriented
individuals become entrepreneurs, and more development-oriented
entrepreneurs transfer technology immediately into their own firms.
Greater exposure to the technological source through longer years of
service at the labs leads to more technology transferred to the new company.
This effect is supplemented if the entrepreneur starts his company on a
"moonlighting" basis, working part-time in the new enterprise while
1
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continuing "full-time" in the source lab.
Personal ability to perceive, understand and apply advanced technology,
manifested by an advanced formal educational level, is seen to be supportive
of entrepreneurial technology transfer, although some negative effects seem
to be provided by Ph.D.-level education. Somewhat countering the positive
influence of education is the negative influence of aging, especially beyond
the age of 40, on transferring source-learned technology to the new company.
Individual attitudes reinforce abilities. Those who see their former
source organization's work as challenging and satisfying seem to find and
transfer more technology to their own startups, although obvious success in
technology transfer might enhance one's feelings of satisfaction with a prior
employer.
Far more significant than personal aging, the principal dissipative
influence on technology transfer is a delay between terminating employment
at a source organization and establishing the new enterprise. The decaying
effect on the technological basis of the company is strong and nearly
immediate, essentially full dissipation of transferability occurring within
four years after departure.
Finally, those who identify utilization of some technology as the prime
reason for leaving the source organization make highly important transfers to
their new firms. They sense and immediately attempt to commercially apply
an advanced technology.
It is critical to point out in closing that few of the entrepreneurs left
their sources with a product that had actually been developed at work. The
technology transferred was advanced knowledge that they had learned and
then applied in the creation of their new enterprises. The effects of this
technology transfer upon the success of the new firm will be discussed in
later work.
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Table 11. Characteristic Influences
on Technology Transferred to the New Enterprise
Source of Advanced Technology
Development-oriented work at source organization
Exposure to the Technology
Length of service at source
Part-time founding
Personal Ability and Attitude
Moderate educational level
Negative effect of aging
Sense of challenge and satisfaction with source
Dissipative Influence
Years between source and new enterprise
Opportunities for Technology Use
Technology as prime reason for departure
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